Physical Address
Lesya Kurbasa 7B
03194 Kyiv, Kyivska obl, Ukraine
Physical Address
Lesya Kurbasa 7B
03194 Kyiv, Kyivska obl, Ukraine
Cryptocurrency mining malware continues to be a persistent threat in the cybersecurity landscape. The XMR64.exe cryptominer represents a sophisticated strain of mining malware that targets Monero (XMR) cryptocurrency, leveraging victims’ computing resources without consent. This comprehensive analysis provides security researchers and system administrators with detailed technical insights into this threat’s behavior, detection methods, and effective removal techniques.
The XMR64.exe cryptominer belongs to a class of threats that leverages the computational resources of infected systems to mine Monero cryptocurrency. Unlike Bitcoin mining that requires specialized ASIC hardware, Monero can be profitably mined using standard CPUs and GPUs, making it a preferred target for cryptominers like this one.
Our analysis shows technical similarities between XMR64.exe and other mining malware like that distributed in the Dofoil trojan campaigns, though with more sophisticated evasion mechanisms and a streamlined mining component.
Attribute | Details |
---|---|
Filename | xmr64.exe (and variants: svcmonit.exe, wuaserv64.exe, lsmos.exe, cryptoupdate.exe) |
File Size | Typically 2-4 MB |
File Type | Windows PE32+ executable (64-bit) |
Compilation | C/C++, often with MinGW compiler |
Code Signing | Unsigned or signed with stolen/fraudulent certificates |
Embedded Mining Engine | Modified XMRig (open-source Monero miner) |
Cryptographic Hash (Common Variant) | MD5: 7b2b1a2a89ec6d94b8e957a73041109b SHA-256: e9d33ff1b4c71d36a18e0d1f05f71b0e09cd2896c4756647e8df5a858fe82c7c |
Anti-Analysis Features | Process hollowing, API hooking, VM detection, debugging checks |
When executed, XMR64.exe implements a sophisticated multi-stage infection process designed to establish persistence, evade detection, and maximize mining efficiency:
Source: Analysis of XMR64.exe behavior patterns observed during controlled execution in sandbox environments
The initial stage typically performs the following operations:
Security researchers have observed XMR64.exe making the following notable system modifications:
The malware typically adds entries to the following registry locations:
Creates scheduled tasks with names mimicking legitimate Windows tasks:
These tasks typically execute with SYSTEM privileges at regular intervals to ensure the mining process remains active.
Advanced variants establish WMI event subscriptions that respond to system events (such as user logon or specific application execution) to trigger the miner, a technique also seen in some variants of Emotet.
XMR64.exe establishes connections to mining pools and command and control (C2) servers. Network traffic shows these key patterns:
Traffic Type | Details | Purpose |
---|---|---|
Mining Pool Communication | TCP connections to ports 3333, 5555, 7777, or 9000 Commonly used domains: crypto-pool.fr, xmrpool.eu, supportxmr.com, xmr.pool.minergate.com |
Submit mining work and receive new tasks |
C2 Communication | HTTPS (port 443) connections with unusual TLS fingerprints HTTP requests with distinctive User-Agent strings DNS queries for randomly generated domains |
Report infection status, receive configuration updates, download additional payloads |
Protocol Characteristics | Stratum mining protocol over TCP Custom encrypted protocols for C2 traffic Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) for fallback C2s |
Ensure mining efficiency and maintain control even if primary C2 servers are blocked |
The network traffic often employs encryption and obfuscation techniques to evade detection, similar to those observed in TrickBot infections but tailored for mining operations.
Our research has identified several primary distribution methods for XMR64.exe:
Source: Distribution vector prevalence based on analysis of 500+ XMR64.exe infection incidents
A typical infection sequence involves:
Security researchers and system administrators should monitor for these technical indicators:
Removing XMR64.exe requires a comprehensive approach targeting all components of the infection. For security professionals, follow this technical removal procedure:
Get-Process
|
Where-Object
{
$_
.CPU
-gt
50
-and
$_
.ProcessName
-notmatch
'^(chrome|firefox|edge|steam|explorer)$'
} |
Select-Object
ProcessName, Path, CPU
schtasks /query /fo CSV /v > tasks.csv
netstat
-anob
> connections.txt
Stop-Process
-Name
"xmr64"
-Force
Stop-Process
-Id
[process_id]
-Force
wmic
process
where
"commandline like '%crypto%'"
delete
wmic
process
where
"commandline like '%xmr%'"
delete
schtasks /delete /tn
"Windows Update Assistant"
/f
schtasks /delete /tn
"Microsoft Compatibility Telemetry"
/f
# Export registry keys first for backup
reg export HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run run_backup.reg
reg export HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run run_user_backup.reg
# Remove suspicious entries
reg delete HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v
"[suspicious entry name]"
/f
reg delete HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v
"[suspicious entry name]"
/f
sc stop
"[service name]"
sc delete
"[service name]"
# List and identify suspicious WMI event subscriptions
Get-WmiObject
-Namespace
root\Subscription
-Class
__EventFilter
Get-WmiObject
-Namespace
root\Subscription
-Class
__EventConsumer
Get-WmiObject
-Namespace
root\Subscription
-Class
__FilterToConsumerBinding
# Remove specific subscription (example)
$filter
=
Get-WmiObject
-Namespace
root\Subscription
-Class
__EventFilter
-Filter
"Name='[filter name]'"
$consumer
=
Get-WmiObject
-Namespace
root\Subscription
-Class
CommandLineEventConsumer
-Filter
"Name='[consumer name]'"
$binding
=
Get-WmiObject
-Namespace
root\Subscription
-Class
__FilterToConsumerBinding
-Filter
"Filter = $filter AND Consumer = $consumer"
$binding
.Delete()
$filter
.Delete()
$consumer
.Delete()
Remove-Item
-Path
$env:APPDATA
\Microsoft\Windows\*.exe
-Force
Remove-Item
-Path
$env:LOCALAPPDATA
\Temp\*.dll
-Force
Remove-Item
-Path
$env:PROGRAMDATA
\
[suspicious folder]
\*.*
-Recurse
-Force
Get-ChildItem
-Path
C:\
-Recurse
-Force
-File
-ErrorAction
SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object
{
$_
.CreationTime
-gt
(
Get-Date
).AddDays(-7)} |
Where-Object
{
$_
.Name
-match
'.*\.(exe|dll|ps1)$'
} |
Select-Object
FullName,CreationTime
For comprehensive removal that addresses hidden components and registry issues, we recommend using specialized anti-malware software:
Implement these technical controls to prevent XMR64.exe and similar cryptominer infections:
Set-ExecutionPolicy
Restricted
Maintaining these defenses can help prevent cryptomining malware as well as other threats like Wacatac Trojan that often use similar infection vectors.
For security researchers conducting in-depth analysis of XMR64.exe samples, these advanced indicators and techniques may prove valuable:
The XMR64.exe cryptominer employs several advanced code injection techniques:
Researchers should be aware of these anti-analysis mechanisms:
When analyzing memory dumps, look for these patterns:
Mining configuration often contains these elements:
{
"algo": "rx/0",
"pools": [
{
"url": "pool.supportxmr.com:5555",
"user": "4BrL51JCc9NGQ71kWhnYoDRffsDZy7m1HUU7MRU4nUMXAHNFBEJhkTZV9HdaL4gfuNBxLPc3BeMkLGaPbF5vWtANQn6naKDGDPP8Frr9XA",
"pass": "x",
"keepalive": true,
"tls": true
}
],
"api": {
"port": 0,
"access-token": null,
"worker-id": null,
"ipv6": false,
"restricted": true
},
"http": {
"enabled": false,
"port": 0,
"access-token": null,
"restricted": true
},
"background": false,
"colors": true,
"donate-level": 0,
"log-file": null,
"print-time": 60,
"retries": 5,
"retry-pause": 5,
"syslog": false,
"user-agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36",
"watch": false
}
Note the obfuscated user-agent string and the Monero wallet address in the “user” field, typical indicators of XMR64.exe configuration.
While XMR64.exe specifically targets Windows 64-bit systems, researchers should be aware that the same threat actors often deploy variants for other platforms:
These cross-platform campaigns share infrastructure and wallet addresses, allowing for attribution and tracking across different environments.
Look for these key symptoms: unusually high CPU or GPU usage when the system should be idle, fans running at high speed due to overheating, significant decrease in system performance, unexpected increases in electricity bills, and the presence of unfamiliar processes in Task Manager (particularly those with names like xmr64.exe, svcmonit.exe, or other variants).
Yes, prolonged infection can potentially cause hardware damage. The continuous high CPU/GPU utilization leads to increased heat generation and power consumption. This can accelerate component wear, reduce hardware lifespan, and in extreme cases, cause system instability or failure, particularly in systems with inadequate cooling.
Cryptominers like XMR64.exe target Monero (XMR) for several technical reasons: Monero’s mining algorithm (RandomX) is designed to be CPU/GPU-friendly rather than requiring specialized ASIC hardware; Monero provides built-in privacy features that make transactions untraceable, helping attackers hide their activities; and Monero mining can still be profitable on consumer hardware, unlike Bitcoin which requires specialized equipment to be economically viable.
While XMR64.exe primarily focuses on mining cryptocurrency rather than stealing credentials, it’s still a best practice to change passwords after any malware infection. Some variants of cryptominers are distributed alongside information-stealing malware or may have secondary payloads with broader capabilities. Check your accounts for any unauthorized activity, particularly cryptocurrency wallets.
Yes, reinfection is possible if the root cause isn’t addressed. The malware may have established persistence mechanisms that weren’t fully removed, or the original infection vector might still be present (such as a vulnerable application or compromised account). To prevent reinfection, ensure all persistence mechanisms are removed, all security patches are applied, and implement the prevention measures outlined in this article.
The XMR64.exe cryptominer represents a sophisticated threat that combines elements of traditional malware with cryptocurrency mining capabilities. While its primary purpose is resource theft rather than data exfiltration, the significant system impact and sophisticated evasion techniques make it a serious concern for organizations and individuals alike.
By understanding its technical operation, implementing proper detection mechanisms, and following the advanced removal procedures outlined in this analysis, security professionals can effectively combat this threat. Additionally, the preventive measures described will help strengthen overall security posture against similar threats.
To protect against this and similar threats, we recommend maintaining updated security software like GridinSoft Anti-Malware, which can detect and remove cryptominers before they cause significant damage. For organizations managing multiple endpoints, implementing robust monitoring for unusual CPU usage patterns and suspicious network connections remains essential for early detection.
Remember that cryptominers like XMR64.exe often serve as indicators of security gaps that could be exploited by more dangerous malware. Addressing these vulnerabilities is crucial for maintaining a strong security posture against the evolving threat landscape.