Physical Address
Lesya Kurbasa 7B
03194 Kyiv, Kyivska obl, Ukraine
Physical Address
Lesya Kurbasa 7B
03194 Kyiv, Kyivska obl, Ukraine
The PUADlManager malware family represents a persistent threat in the cybersecurity landscape, encompassing various potentially unwanted applications that primarily focus on advertising and data collection. This comprehensive analysis examines the technical aspects of this malware family, focusing on its most prevalent variants: SnackArcin and OfferCore. While not as destructive as ransomware like Sarcoma, these threats can significantly compromise user privacy and system performance.
Threat Name | PUADlManager, PUA:Win32/DLManager, SnackArcin, OfferCore, Win32/PUADlManager |
Type | Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA), Adware, Bundleware |
Detection Names | Microsoft: PUA:Win32/DLManager, PUA:Win32/OfferCore, PUA:Win32/InstallCore, PUA:Win32/Sepdot Malwarebytes: PUP.Optional.SnackArcin, PUP.Optional.DLManager, PUP.Optional.InstallCore GridinSoft: PUA.DlManager, PUA.OfferCore, PUA.InstallCore Symantec: PUA.Win32.DLManager, PUA.Win32.OfferCore, PUA.Win32.SnackArcin Kaspersky: HEUR:PUA.Win32.DLManager, Not-a-virus:AdWare.Win32.DLManager ESET: Win32/PUA.DLManager, Win32/PUA.OfferCore, Win32/PUA.InstallCore Trend Micro: PUA_DLMANAGER, PUA_OFFERCORE, PUA_SNACKARCIN.AZKIA Avast: Win32:PUA-gen [PUP], Win32:SnackArcin-A [PUP] |
First Detected | 2019 (with significant evolution through 2025) |
Platforms Affected | Windows 7, 8, 8.1, 10, 11 |
Distribution Methods | Software bundling, fake updates, misleading download portals, adware installers |
Symptoms | Excessive advertisements, unwanted browser extensions, system slowdowns, browser redirection |
Danger Level | Medium – Not directly destructive but significantly compromises privacy and system performance |
PUADlManager (also known as PUA:Win32/DLManager) is a classification used by Microsoft and other security vendors to identify a family of potentially unwanted applications that specialize in downloading and installing additional unwanted software. The name derives from “Download Manager,” reflecting its primary function of delivering secondary payloads to infected systems.
These applications operate in a legal gray area – they’re not technically viruses like Wacatac or other destructive malware, but they engage in deceptive practices that violate user trust and compromise system security and performance. Microsoft’s detection engine classifies these as Potentially Unwanted Applications (PUAs) rather than outright malware, although the distinction offers little comfort to affected users.
Source: Analysis of PUADlManager behavior patterns based on Microsoft Security Intelligence threat data, 2025
The SnackArcin variant of PUADlManager emerged in early 2020 and has since become one of the most prevalent members of this malware family. First identified and named by security researchers examining its unique filesystem and registry artifacts, SnackArcin typically disguises itself as a useful utility, often using names like “VideoOptimizer,” “QuickMediaConverter,” or “FastDownloader.”
SnackArcin employs sophisticated techniques to maintain persistence and evade detection:
Feature | Technical Implementation | Purpose |
---|---|---|
File System Structure | Creates hidden directories in %AppData%\Local\Temp and %ProgramData% | Store configuration files and downloaded components |
Registry Modifications | Creates entries in HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run | Maintain persistence across system reboots |
Process Injection | Uses CreateRemoteThread API to inject code into legitimate processes | Evade detection by running within trusted processes |
Encrypted Communication | Uses custom encryption for C2 communications | Avoid network traffic analysis and detection |
Anti-VM Techniques | Checks for virtual machine artifacts, debugging tools | Evade analysis in security research environments |
When active on a system, SnackArcin exhibits several distinctive behaviors:
%AppData%\Local\Temp\SA_Engine.dll %AppData%\Local\Temp\SA_Config.dat %AppData%\Roaming\SnackMedia\update.exe %ProgramData%\SnackArcin\main.exe %AppData%\Local\Temp\[random].tmp (multiple instances) |
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run "SnackMedia Update" = "%AppData%\Roaming\SnackMedia\update.exe" HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\[legitimate process names] - Used for process hijacking HKCU\Software\SnackArcin\ - Contains configuration and tracking identifiers |
The OfferCore variant represents a more recent evolution in the PUADlManager family, with enhanced capabilities for monetization and system manipulation. It first appeared in late 2021 and has since become increasingly prevalent, often working in conjunction with SnackArcin or installed as a secondary payload.
OfferCore builds upon the foundation established by earlier PUADlManager variants with several advanced features:
Feature | Technical Implementation | Purpose |
---|---|---|
Browser Extension Injection | Creates and sideloads malicious browser extensions | Maintain persistent browser access across sessions |
Certificate Spoofing | Uses stolen or fake code signing certificates | Appear legitimate to security scanners and users |
Component-Based Architecture | Uses modular design with separate downloaders, installers, and payloads | Facilitate updates and evade complete detection |
WMI Persistence | Uses Windows Management Instrumentation for persistence | Maintain access through advanced methods that survive standard cleanup |
Driver-Level Operation | Some variants attempt to load kernel drivers | Gain deeper system access and frustrate removal attempts |
OfferCore exhibits several behaviors that distinguish it from SnackArcin:
%ProgramFiles(x86)%\OfferCore\ocservice.exe %AppData%\Local\OfferCore\ocupdate.exe %AppData%\Local\OfferCore\Resources\oc_extension.crx %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\[random]\oc_setup[random].exe %Temp%\OCInstall\[random].dat |
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run "OCService" = "%ProgramFiles(x86)%\OfferCore\ocservice.exe" HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Ext\Settings\[extension ID] - Browser extension settings HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\OCService - Service registration HKCU\Software\OfferCoreApp\ - Configuration and tracking data |
Both SnackArcin and OfferCore variants maintain communication with command and control servers for several purposes:
Network traffic analysis reveals distinct patterns associated with PUADlManager variants:
Source: Controlled environment monitoring of PUADlManager variants, GridinSoft Research Lab, 2025
The following domains have been associated with PUADlManager variants in recent campaigns. This list is not exhaustive as new domains are constantly registered as old ones are blocked:
# SnackArcin C2 domains cdn-content.snackmedia[.]com update.snackarcincdn[.]com stats-collect.sncmedia[.]net dl.mediasncr[.]com # OfferCore C2 domains cdn.offercoremedia[.]com stats.ocmetrics[.]net update.occdn[.]services api.offercorestats[.]com install.ocservices[.]net |
Network traffic to these domains is typically encrypted, but patterns in the timing and volume of communications can help identify infections even when the content is obscured.
A detailed examination of the network protocols used by these variants reveals a structured approach to data exchange:
Several indicators can help identify a PUADlManager infection on your system:
For technical users or system administrators, these methods can help confirm a PUADlManager infection:
Use Task Manager or Process Explorer to look for suspicious processes:
# Common process names associated with PUADlManager variants SA_Engine.exe SnackMedia.exe ocservice.exe ocupdate.exe SMUpdate.exe dlmanager.exe offer_core_service.exe snackmedia_helper.exe |
Use netstat or other network monitoring tools to identify suspicious connections:
# Command to view active connections (Windows) netstat -ano | findstr ESTABLISHED # Look for connections to known C2 domains netstat -ano | findstr "snackmedia offercore occdn ocmetrics" |
Check for suspicious registry entries that enable persistence:
# Command to check startup registry keys (Windows) reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" # Specifically check for known entries reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "SnackMedia Update" reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "OCService" |
Removing PUADlManager variants requires a systematic approach to ensure all components are eliminated:
# SnackArcin files to delete del /f /q "%AppData%\Local\Temp\SA_Engine.dll" del /f /q "%AppData%\Local\Temp\SA_Config.dat" rmdir /s /q "%AppData%\Roaming\SnackMedia" rmdir /s /q "%ProgramData%\SnackArcin" # OfferCore files to delete rmdir /s /q "%ProgramFiles(x86)%\OfferCore" rmdir /s /q "%AppData%\Local\OfferCore" rmdir /s /q "%Temp%\OCInstall" |
# SnackArcin registry entries to delete reg delete "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "SnackMedia Update" /f reg delete "HKCU\Software\SnackArcin" /f # OfferCore registry entries to delete reg delete "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "OCService" /f reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\OCService" /f reg delete "HKCU\Software\OfferCoreApp" /f |
For a more thorough and reliable removal process, specialized security software is recommended:
PUADlManager variants have shown consistent growth in distribution over recent years, with SnackArcin and OfferCore representing the largest share of detections:
Source: Compiled from Microsoft Security Intelligence and GridinSoft telemetry data, 2020-2025
To protect your system from PUADlManager and similar threats, follow these best practices:
PUADlManager variants often operate in conjunction with other threats:
While PUADlManager variants themselves are not typically used to deliver more dangerous malware, they create security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by other threats, and the infrastructure changes they make to systems can facilitate further infections.
PUADlManager is not technically classified as a virus but rather as a Potentially Unwanted Application (PUA). Unlike viruses that are designed specifically to cause damage or steal information, PUADlManager variants operate in a legal gray area. They typically bundle with legitimate software and perform unwanted but not explicitly malicious actions like displaying advertisements and collecting user data. However, the distinction offers little comfort to affected users, as the privacy implications and system performance impact can be significant. Microsoft and other security vendors classify these programs as potentially unwanted rather than malware because they often include minimal disclosure in end-user license agreements that users technically agree to during installation, though these disclosures are frequently buried in legal text that few people read.
PUADlManager variants typically reach users’ systems through several deceptive distribution methods. The most common is software bundling, where PUADlManager components are included as “additional offers” during the installation of legitimate free software. Users often inadvertently consent to these installations by using quick or default installation options rather than custom installations where they could opt out. Other distribution channels include misleading advertisements that prompt fake updates, compromised download portals that inject additional installers, and drive-by downloads from malicious websites. Some variants are also distributed through affiliates who earn commission for each successful installation. The common thread among these methods is that they rely on deception or user inattention rather than technical exploitation, which is why awareness and careful installation practices are crucial for prevention.
There are several reasons why PUADlManager variants might not be detected by all antivirus programs. First, security vendors have different policies regarding potentially unwanted applications versus malware – some only flag them as warnings rather than threats, while others require explicit configuration to detect PUAs at all. Second, these programs frequently update and modify their code to evade signature-based detection. Third, PUADlManager developers often use code signing certificates and legitimate development techniques that make their software appear more trustworthy to security scanners. Additionally, some variants employ sophisticated anti-analysis techniques that can detect when they’re being examined by security software and alter their behavior accordingly. Finally, the legal gray area these programs operate in creates hesitation among some security vendors who fear potential legal challenges from developers claiming their software is legitimate. For comprehensive protection, it’s important to use security solutions specifically configured to detect potentially unwanted applications and not just traditional malware.
PUADlManager variants collect extensive information about users and their browsing habits, though the specific data gathered varies between variants. Most commonly, they track browsing history, search queries, websites visited, and time spent on different pages. Many variants also collect system information including installed software, hardware specifications, operating system details, and IP address data that can be used for geolocation. The more aggressive variants may capture form data entered on websites (potentially including usernames), monitor online purchase behavior, and track ad interactions. Some variants like OfferCore have been observed attempting to access browser password stores or autofill data, though modern browsers have security measures to limit this. The collected information is typically used for targeted advertising purposes but may also be sold to data brokers or other third parties without user consent. This extensive data collection represents a significant privacy concern, especially since users are rarely aware of the scope of monitoring occurring on their systems.
Yes, a complete factory reset of your computer will effectively remove all PUADlManager variants and associated components, as it returns the operating system to its original state. However, this is generally considered an extreme solution given the significant inconvenience of reinstalling all your applications and restoring your personal files. Before pursuing a factory reset, you should attempt more targeted removal methods such as using specialized anti-malware tools like Trojan Killer that can identify and remove these threats while preserving your system configuration. If you do proceed with a factory reset, make sure to back up your important files beforehand, but be careful not to restore any program files or settings backups that might reintroduce the infection. After resetting, implement better security practices like using reputable security software and being cautious about software downloads to prevent reinfection. For more information on factory resets and malware removal, see our article on whether factory resets remove viruses.
The PUADlManager malware family, including the SnackArcin and OfferCore variants, represents a significant but often underestimated threat to Windows users. While these applications may operate in a legal gray area rather than as outright malware, their impact on system performance, privacy, and security is substantial.
As distribution methods become more sophisticated and evasion techniques continue to evolve, maintaining awareness and implementing strong preventive measures is essential. Regular system scans with specialized security software like Trojan Killer can help detect and remove these threats before they compromise your privacy or degrade system performance.
Remember that the best defense against PUADlManager and similar threats is prevention through cautious downloading practices, attention to installation options, and maintaining updated security software.